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Abstract 
This paper aims to generate new theoretical and empirical insights into the way states 
and policies shape migration processes in their interaction with other migration 
determinants in receiving and sending countries. More fundamentally, this state of-
the-art reveals a still limited understanding of the forces driving migration. Although 
there is consensus that macro-contextual economic and political factors and meso-
level factors such as networks all play ‘some’ role, there is no agreement on their 
relative weight and mutual interaction. To start filling that gap, this paper outlines the 
contours of a conceptual framework for generating improved insights into the ways 
states and policies shape migration processes in their interaction with structural 
migration determinants in receiving and sending countries. First, it argues that the 
fragmented insights from different disciplinary theories can be integrated in one 
framework through conceptualizing virtually all forms of migration as a function of 
capabilities and aspirations. Second, to increase conceptual clarity it distinguishes the 
preponderant role of states in migration processes from the hypothetically more 
marginal role of specific immigration and emigration policies. Subsequently, it 
hypothesizes four different ‘substitution effects’ which can partly explain why polices 
fail to meet their objectives. This framework will serve as a conceptual guide for the 
determinants of international migration research. 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper outlines the scientific rationale of 
this project by analysing the main gaps in 
migration policy and migration determinants 
research. It outlines the contours of a 
conceptual framework and a set of hypotheses 
for generating improved insights into the ways 
states and policies shape migration processes 
in their interaction with structural migration 
determinants in receiving and sending 
countries, which will guide the determinants of 
international migration project. In wealthy 
countries, immigration, in particular of low-
skilled and culturally distinct people from 
poorer countries, is increasingly perceived as 
a problem in need of control. The common – 
but not unproblematic – perception is that 
policy-makers have reacted to this pressure 
by implementing restrictive immigration 
policies and increasing border controls 
(Massey et al. 1998).  
However, the effectiveness of such policies has 
been often contested in the face of their oft-
supposed failure to significantly affect the 
level of immigration and their hypothesized 
unintended, perverse and often 
counterproductive effects such as pushing 
migrants into permanent settlement, 
discouraging return and encouraging 
irregular movements and migration through 
alternative legal or geographical channels 
(Castles 2004b; Grütters 2003). However, 
other scholars have argued that, on the whole, 
state policies have been largely effective 
(Brochmann & Hammar 1999; Strikwerda 
1999), which also seems to be partly confirmed 
by a limited number of quantitative studies 
indicating that specific policy interventions 
can have a significant effect on migration 
flows.  
Despite apparently increasing immigration 
restrictions, the volume of South–North 
migration has only increased over the past few 
decades. But does this mean that migration 
policies have failed and that states are 
generally unable to control migration? Not 
necessarily. First of all, we should not confuse 
statistical association with causality, which is 
particularly difficult to establish because we 
generally lack counterfactual cases. For 
instance, one might argue that the migration-
reducing effects of immigration restrictions 
are counterbalanced by the migration-
increasing effects of growing economic gaps 
between sending and receiving countries or 
economic growth in receiving countries, or the 
lifting of exit restrictions by origin countries.  
Hence, sustained or increasing migration does 
not necessarily prove policy ineffectiveness – 
as migration volumes might have been higher 
without migration controls. The other way 
around, a decrease in migration does not 
prove the policy successful – although 
politicians are generally eager to make such 
claims – as such a decrease might for instance 
also be the result of economic growth or an 
end of conflict in origin countries, or an 
economic recession in destination countries. 
So, finding better methodological approaches 
to establish (multiple) causality constitutes the 
first challenge facing research on this issue. 
Besides the huge difficulties involved in 
‘proving’ causality as such, a second challenge 
is to bring more precision in research by 
assessing the relative importance of 
immigration policies compared to the effects 
of other migration determinants. After all, it 
can hardly be surprising that most policies 
discouraging or encouraging particular 
manifestations of migration will have ‘some’ 
effect. The real question is about the relative 
magnitude of this effect compared to macro-
contextual migration determinants, which will 
eventually also determine the effectiveness 
and efficiency of policies. Although some 
studies assert a statistical relation between 
certain policy measures and particular 
migration flows, the relative importance of 
policy effects compared to the effects of other 
migration determinants remains largely 
unclear.  
It is one thing to find that restrictions on, say, 
lows killed labour migration have a significant 
effect on decreasing inflows, but the real 
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question is how large this effect is compared to 
the effect of other factors such as economic 
growth, employment, violent political conflict 
and personal freedoms. If the latter factors 
explain most variance in migration, one might 
for instance conclude that policies have a 
certain, but also limited effect on overall 
volumes and trends of migration. In other 
words, if most variance in migration is 
explained by structural migration 
determinants or other policies, the margin of 
manoeuvre for migration policies is 
fundamentally limited. 
In addition to finding better ways to measure 
the existence and relative magnitude of policy 
effects, a third, related, challenge is to 
improve insights into the very nature and 
evolution of migration policies. There seems to 
be reason to question the general assertion 
that migration policies have become more 
restrictive over the past decades. Although 
this idea is often taken for granted, the diverse 
and multiple nature of migration policies 
raises questions about our ability and utility to 
measure ‘overall’ levels of restrictiveness, and 
even about the overall assumption that 
policies have become more restrictive.  
While several countries have raised barriers 
for particular categories of migrants (for 
instance, low-skilled workers and asylum 
seekers), not all countries have done so, and 
immigration of other categories has often been 
facilitated. Changes in migration policy 
typically facilitate the entry of particular origin 
groups while simultaneously restricting the 
entry of other groups. For instance, ‘Fortress 
Europe’ may be an adequate metaphor to 
characterize policies towards asylum seekers 
and refugees (Hatton 2004), but seems 
inappropriate to characterize the immigration 
policies of EU or OECD countries as a whole. 
Another example is the US Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1965, which ‘equalized’ 
immigration policies by ending positive 
discrimination of European immigrants and 
contributing to increasing non-European 
migration. This also reveals the strong 
Eurocentric bias underlying common views 
that migration to the USA, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand was largely ‘free’ until at 
least the mid twentieth century (Hatton & 
Williamson 1998) – it may have been relatively 
free for Europeans, but this was certainly not 
the case for Asians or Africans, for whom 
recent reforms have meant a liberalization. 
Also countries’ membership and accession to 
regional blocks such as the European Union 
typically coincides with liberalization of 
migration of citizens of member states, while 
immigration restrictions for ‘third-country’ 
nationals are sustained or further tightened 
(Mannan & Krueger 1996).  
Because migration policies typically consist of 
a ‘mixed bag’ of various measures targeting 
particular groups of immigrants, there is a 
considerable risk of over-generalizing. While 
migration policies are likely to affect patterns 
of migration selectivity, the impact on the 
overall magnitude of migration flows is more 
uncertain as these are strongly affected by 
other macro-structural factors, while migrants’ 
agency and strategies tend to create meso-
level structures which facilitate migration over 
formally closed borders. Since state policies 
simultaneously constrain or enable 
immigration and emigration of particular 
groups along particular geographical 
pathways, states perhaps play a more 
significant role in structuring emigration 
through influencing the (initial) composition 
and spatial patterns of migration, rather than in 
affecting overall volumes and long-term 
trends, which, particularly in liberal 
democracies, appear to be primarily affected 
by other, economic, social and cultural 
migration determinants (Mannan & Krueger 
1998). 
These examples show that any serious inquiry 
into the effect of migration policies not only 
needs to define the concept, but also to 
‘unpack’ or disaggregate ‘migration policies’ 
into the multitude of laws, measures and 
regulations states deploy in their attempts to 
regulate immigration and emigration along 
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categories that are based on national origin 
and further characteristics such as gender, 
age, education, occupation and officially 
defined main migration motives. As migration 
policies are typically affected and shaped by 
different, often opposed, interests, policies are 
typically internally incoherent, which further 
emphasizes the need to break down policies 
into the specific measures and regulations 
they comprise. 
In addition, conventional views of increasing 
migration policy restrictiveness typically 
ignore emigration policies pursued by origin 
states, which are as diverse and multiple as 
immigration policies, but which seem to have 
become less restrictive overall. Only a 
declining number of strong, authoritarian 
states with closed economies are willing and 
capable of imposing blanket exit restrictions. 
Paradoxically, while an increasing number of, 
particularly developing, countries seem to 
aspire to regulate emigration, their capability 
to do so is fundamentally and increasingly 
limited by legal (human rights), economic and 
political constraints. The ability of 
governments to affect overall immigration and 
emigration levels seems to decrease as the 
level of authoritarianism goes down. This also 
reveals the need to look beyond the role of 
migration policies per se and to explore the 
ways in which states affect the migration 
process more generally. 
1.2 STUDY APPROACH 
So, the crucial question remains: how do states 
and policies shape migration processes 
independently of and in their interaction with 
other migration determinants in receiving and 
sending countries? Due to serious 
methodological and theoretical flaws, 
scholarly research has so far hardly been able 
to produce convincing answers to these 
questions, and the second and third questions 
in particular. The inconclusive nature of this 
debate reveals an overall lack of conceptual, 
analytical and empirical rigour in the study of 
migration policy effects. Most existing 
evidence is descriptive, biased and partial, 
which is related to the weak embedding of 
migration policies research into general 
theories on the causes of migration. 
In this context, it is important to emphasize that 
the limited of capacity of research to answer 
these key questions is not exclusively linked to 
limitations of data and statistical models, but 
also to the rather weak theoretical foundations 
of ‘push-pull’ or gravity models which are 
routinely, but uncritically, used for studying 
migration determinants. For the very reason 
that they are often not grounded in migration 
theory, they tend to ignore or fail to properly 
specify several theoretically important 
migration determinants in receiving and, 
particularly, sending countries. Even with 
ideal data, statistical analyses will not lead to 
compelling evidence if theoretically relevant 
migration determinants are omitted in 
empirical models, or if models are based on 
the short term or only focus on one particular 
migration flow. This makes it impossible to 
study possible knock-on effects or what I have 
dubbed ‘substitution effects’ of one particular 
measure through the diversion of migration 
flows to other geographical, legal or illegal 
channels. 
In order to improve insights into the role of 
states and policies in migration processes, 
there is a need to embed the systematic 
analysis of policy effects into a comprehensive 
analytical framework of the sending- and 
receiving-country factors driving international 
migration. Although there is consensus that 
macro-contextual economic and political 
factors and meso-level factors such as 
networks all play ‘some’ role, there is no 
agreement on their relative weight and mutual 
interaction. How do migration policies 
precisely affect migration if we control for the 
many other factors that drive international 
migration? Or, to turn the question around: 
how do macro-level processes such as 
‘development’, economic growth, 
demographic change, education, 
democratization and conflict in origin and 
destination countries affect migration 
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independently from policy interventions? In 
other words, what are the constraints and 
relative margins within which migration 
policies can have an effect? 
Why has research on this issue hardly 
advanced over the past decades? A first 
problem is the rather weak connection 
between studies on migration policies and 
migration determinants on the one hand and 
fundamental research and theories on the 
causes of migration on the other. A second 
problem is that fundamental theoretical 
research on the nature and causes of migration 
processes has made relatively little progress 
over the last few decades (Arango 2000; 
Massey et al. 1998). There is a plethora of 
research on the social, cultural and economic 
impacts of migration on sending and, 
particularly, receiving societies.  
In comparison, and with the possible 
exception of research on migration networks, 
there has been much less theoretically driven 
research on the nature and causes of migration 
processes themselves. This particularly 
applies to the study of the precise role of 
policies and states in migration processes. 
Other factors obstructing advances in 
research on migration determinants are data 
problems and unproductive divisions 
between, particularly economic and non-
economic, social science disciplines as well as 
qualitative and quantitative approaches. 
To start filling these research gaps, in this 
paper I aim to outline the contours of a 
theoretical and empirical research agenda for 
generating improved insights into the ways 
states and policies shape migration processes 
independently from and in their interaction 
with other migration determinants in receiving 
and sending countries. First, I will review 
existing, often disciplinary, theories on 
migration and I will argue how their 
fragmented insights can be integrated in one 
framework through conceptualizing virtually 
all manifestations of migration as a function of 
capabilities and aspirations to migrate. 
Second, I will argue that considerable 
conceptual confusion can be removed if we 
distinguish the preponderant role of states in 
migration processes from the hypothetically 
more marginal role of specific immigration 
and emigration policies. Subsequently, based 
on a brief theorization of the role of states and 
policies in migration I will hypothesize four 
different ‘substitution effects’ explaining 
migration policy failure, which can guide 
further research on migration determinants 
within and outside the context of the 
determinants of international migration 
project. 
2.1 FUNCTIONALIST MIGRATION 
THEORIES 
The preceding analysis has indicated that a 
robust analysis of the role of states and policies 
in migration processes is conditional on its 
sound embedding within a more general 
theoretical framework on the determinants of 
migration processes. Although there is a 
quantitative, generally econometrically 
oriented literature on migration determinants 
including some studies on the effect of 
policies, the literature is generally 
characterized by a conspicuous ignorance of 
insights from recent migration theories. 
Hence, migration determinants research is 
generally based on obsolete, theoretically 
void ‘push-pull’ and gravity models. 
Implicitly or explicitly, gravity and push-pull 
models are rooted into functionalist social 
theory. Functionalist social theory tends to see 
society as a system – or an aggregate of 
interdependent parts, with a tendency towards 
equilibrium. This perspective, in which people 
are expected to move from low-income to 
high-income areas, has remained dominant in 
migration studies since Ravenstein (1885; 
1889) formulated his laws of migration. The 
idea that migration is a function of spatial 
disequilibria constitutes the cornerstone 
assumption of so-called ‘push-pull’ models 
which still dominate much gravitybased 
migration modelling as well as common-
sensical and non-specialist academic thinking 
about migration.  
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Push-pull models usually identify various 
economic, environmental, and demographic 
factors which are assumed to push migrants 
out of places of origin and lure them into 
destination places. While deeply rooted in 
functionalist, equilibrium thinking, it is difficult 
to classify push-pull models a theory because 
they tend merely to specify a rather 
ambiguous list of factors that play ‘a’ role in 
migration. Push-pull models tend to be static 
and tend to portray migrants as ‘passive 
pawns’ lacking any agency which can perhaps 
be defined as the ability of people to make 
independent choices – to act or not act in 
specific ways – and, crucially, to alter structure 
and fail to conceptualize migration as a 
process. 
Neo-classical migration theory is the best 
known and most sophisticated application of 
the functionalist social scientific paradigm in 
migration studies. At the macro-level, 
neoclassical economic theory explains 
migration by geographical differences in the 
supply and demand for labour. At the micro-
level, neo-classical migration theory views 
migrants as individual, rational and income-
maximizing actors, who decide to move on the 
basis of a cost-benefit calculation. Assuming 
free choice and full access to information, they 
are expected to go where they can be the most 
productive, that is, where they are able to earn 
the highest wages. Todaro (1969) and Harris 
and Todaro (1970) elaborated the basic 
twosector model of rural-to-urban migration, 
explaining migration on the basis of ‘expected 
income’ differentials. The initial Harris Todaro 
model for internal migration has, with some 
modifications, also been applied to 
international migration (Borjas 1989; Borjas 
1990). Later modifications of the neo-classical 
model included the costs and risks of 
migration, and conceptualized migration as an 
investment in human capital in order to explain 
migration selectivity (Bauer & Zimmermann 
1998; Sjaastad 1962). 
Neo-classical and other equilibrium migration 
models largely explain migration by 
geographical differences in incomes and 
wage levels (Harris and Todaro 1970; Lee 
1966; Todaro 1969). Although it would be hard 
to deny that economic differentials play a 
major role in driving migration processes, this 
almost sounds more like a truism or 
assumption than a theory. Furthermore, this 
basic insight alone is insufficient to explain the 
strongly patterned, non-random nature of real-
life migration processes. For instance, these 
models have difficulties explaining return 
migration, migration in the absence of wage 
differentials and, particularly, adequately 
grasping the role of states, networks and other 
institutions in structuring migration. They also 
largely ignore non-economic migration 
drivers and typically fail to explain 
development-driven increases in migration. 
2.2 CONFLICT THEORY 
Other theories of migration reject the 
underlying functionalist assumption of 
conventional neo-classical models that 
migration decisions are based on the rational 
cost-benefit calculation of income-maximizing 
individuals operating in well-functioning 
markets. The new economics of labour 
migration (NELM) hypothesizes that migration, 
particularly under conditions of poverty and 
risk, is difficult to explain within a neo-classical 
framework. NELM conceptualizes migration as 
a collective household strategy to overcome 
market failures and spread income risks rather 
than a mere response of income-maximizing 
individuals to expected wage differentials 
(Stark 1991; Stark & Bloom 1985; Taylor 1999). 
This gives considerable theoretical room to 
explain migration in the absence of significant 
wage differentials. NELM also argues that 
income inequality and relative deprivation 
within sending societies are major drivers of 
migration (Skeldon 2002; Stark & Taylor 1989). 
Through remittances, migration can also be a 
livelihood strategy used by families and 
households to raise investment capital if credit 
markets fail. Within a broader social scientific 
perspective, it is possible to reinterpret NELM 
as a theory that explains migration as an active 
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attempt – an act of agency – by social groups 
to overcome structural constraints. An 
important methodological inference of these 
‘new’ theories is that market access, income 
inequality, relative deprivation, and social 
security are important migration 
determinants, and need to be included in 
empirical models if possible. 
NELM-inspired migration theory seems 
particularly relevant for explaining migration 
in developing countries and other situations in 
which migrants face considerable constraint 
and risk, and therefore also seems applicable 
to ‘non-labour’ forms of migration, such as 
refugee migration. This points to a more 
general weakness of conventional ways of 
classifying migration into distinct types and 
the concomitant tendency to develop separate 
theories for them. This is deeply problematic, 
as these migration types reflect legal rather 
than sociological categories. These 
categorizations ignore empirical evidence that 
migration is typically driven by a range of 
contextual factors and that individual 
motivations to migrate are often mixed 
(Mannan & Krueger 2002).. This makes strict 
distinctions such as between voluntary and 
forced migration, or between family and 
labour migration, often deeply problematic. 
This seems certainly to be the case in the 
context of restrictive immigration policies, in 
which prospective migrants perceived 
policies as opportunity structures within which 
the choice of migration channel is likely to be 
based on relative ease and costs rather than on 
a consideration of which category best 
matches their ‘genuine’ migration motives 
(Mannan & Kozlov 2001). 
While some would still classify NELM as an 
amended form of neo-classical theory, a more 
profound critique of neo-classical and push-
pull migration theories would stress their a-
historical nature and their failure to 
conceptualize how macro-structural factors 
such as states, policies, labour markets, status 
hierarchies, power inequalities and social 
group formation strongly constrain individual 
choice and explain why most migration tends 
to occur in socially selective and 
geographically strongly patterned ways; that 
is, along well-defined pathways or corridors 
between particular origins and destinations. 
Conventional economic models usually 
incorporate structural factors as additional 
costs and risks individuals face. It certainly 
does make sense to assume that structural 
constraints affect the cost-benefit calculus and 
destination choice. However, the reduction of 
such factors to individual costs and benefits 
makes such models inherently blind to the 
very structural features of such factors, which 
can only be analysed on the group level as 
they are embedded in and reproduced by 
patterns of relations between people. Despite 
the considerable merits of neo-classical 
approaches, their methodological 
individualism largely inhibits them from 
capturing structural factors. 
At a more fundamental level, functionalist 
social theory can been criticized for being 
unable to explain growing disequilibria, 
structural power inequalities, social 
contradictions and the role of conflict in social 
transformation; as well as for its inability to 
conceptualize structure and agency. In 
contrast, ‘conflict theory’, the social scientific 
opposite of functionalist/equilibrium theory, 
postulates that social and economic systems 
tend to reproduce and reinforce structural 
inequalities and serve the interests of the 
powers that be, and that they can only be 
altered through a radical change in power 
structures through the organized (structured) 
resistance of oppressed groups. In other 
words, social transformation does not often 
come smoothly, and often requires collective 
action enabled by rising consciousness about 
one’s perceived oppression and one’s ability 
to overcome such oppression by peaceful or 
violent resistance (Collins (1994)). 
Within the general social-scientific paradigm 
of ‘conflict theory’, Marxist, dependency, and 
world systems theory tend to see migration as 
the direct outflow of the spread of global 
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capitalism and the related marginalization and 
uprooting of rural populations around the 
world who have no choice other than to 
migrate to cities to join the urban proletariat. 
Migration is therefore seen as a process that 
serves the interests of large corporations and 
specific economic interest groups and states 
that are strongly lobbied by these interests. 
These approaches can be criticized for being 
overly deductive and deterministic, with their 
concomitant portrayal of individuals as passive 
victims of economic macro-forces. In other 
words, individual migrants are hardly 
attributed any agency and, as far as they act, 
they are supposed to make irrational choices. 
In order to explain why people behave in ways 
that go against their own objective, material 
interests, Marxist theory uses the concept of 
false consciousness, which can be defined as 
the ‘failure to recognize the instruments of 
one's oppression or exploitation as one’s own 
creation, as when members of an oppressed 
class unwittingly adopt views of the oppressor 
class’. The assumption that all or most migrants 
behave irrationally seems equally unrealistic 
as the full rationality and income-maximizing 
assumptions of orthodox neo-classical models. 
For instance, it would be difficult to reason that 
the choices of refugees or unemployed 
graduates to emigrate are not rational to a 
considerable extent. 
Although few would still agree with the more 
orthodox versions of neo-Marxist theory in the 
face of ample empirical evidence pointing to 
the fact that poor people also exert a 
considerable amount of agency, it would also 
be naïve to deny that migration processes are 
to a significant extent determined by 
contextual factors, and that while individual 
choice is certainly not absent, it is 
considerably constrained by structural factors 
–facilitating migration of specific social groups 
along specific geographical and legal 
pathways while simultaneously impeding it for 
many others groups and along many other 
pathways. This seems particularly important 
for poor people with limited access to 
resources and markets and living in politically 
repressive environments. 
A powerful example of ‘structure’ – among 
several others – that appears to be particularly 
crucial as a migration determinant is the 
segmentation of labour markets. Dual labour 
market theory (Piore 1979) argued that 
international migration is mainly driven by 
pull factors, since the segmentation of labour 
markets creates a permanent demand for 
cheap immigrant labour at the bottom, 
‘secondary’ end of the labour market to 
occupy jobs that ‘primary’ workers typically 
shun, primarily because of social status and 
relative deprivation motives. The latter 
exemplifies the deep socio-cultural roots of 
what superficially appears to be ‘just’ an 
economic phenomenon (Mannan & Kozlov 
1995). Although this is a partial theory, that 
ignores sending-side explanations altogether 
and implicitly assumes a quasi-unlimited 
supply of migrant workers, its core argument 
is very powerful to explain the remarkable 
persistence of low-skilled migration to wealthy 
countries over the past half century as well as 
the coexistence of domestic unemployment 
and immigration: the demand for low-skilled 
migrants is sector-specific and has become 
structurally embedded in labour market 
structures and socio-cultural hierarchies. 
In this context, Stephen Castles (2002) has 
argued that ‘it is one of the great fictions of our 
age that the “new economy” does not need “-
D workers” any more’. He argued that 
industrialized counties continue to import 
unskilled labor, and that – in the absence of 
sufficient legal channels for low-skilled labour 
migration – this often takes the form of 
systematic use of irregular migrants or asylum 
seekers, whose very lack of rights makes them 
easy to exploit. Although the industries and 
mines in which low-skilled migrants worked 
have declined since the early 1970s, Saskia 
Sassen (1988) has argued that new internal and 
international divisions of labour have arisen, 
particularly in ‘global cities’, where the luxury 
consumption needs of the high-skilled have 
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created new labour market demand, 
particularly in the lower skilled services, such 
as cleaning, childcare, restaurant work, 
gardening, but also in garment manufacture, 
construction, garment manufacture and food 
processing (Castles 2002). 
Further elaborating upon the work by Piore, 
Castles, Sassen and others, it is possible to 
theorize that, over development processes, 
labour markets have grown increasingly 
complex and multi-segmented while the 
general level and degree of specialization in 
education has increased. As the geographical 
expanse of labour markets typically increases 
as education goes up, increasing levels and 
complexity of education and labour markets 
seems to drive people to migrate in order to 
match supply and demand. This seems to be 
one of the main reasons why relatively wealthy 
and developed societies are inherently more 
mobile and migratory than relatively poor 
societies. 
Studying and comparing the structure of 
labour markets as well as concomitant 
differences in income inequalities and relative 
deprivation can also help us to further 
understand the occurrence of significant 
migration between regions or countries with 
similar average income levels. However, these 
hypotheses have remained largely untested. 
The methodological inference of these 
theoretical insights is that, in order to advance 
our understanding of the structural drivers of 
migration processes, there is a need to 
develop empirical approaches to assess the 
interrelated roles of labour market structure, 
education and skill structure, social 
fractionalization and relative deprivation in 
affecting the volume and, particularly, the 
social composition and the geographical 
patterning of migration flows. 
This example of labour markets exemplifies 
that, in order to explain real-world migration 
patterns, there is a need to go beyond gravity 
or push-pull approaches by looking beyond 
the level of ‘national averages’ such as GDP 
per capita and exploring the internal structure 
of societies and economies. This can partly be 
achieved through quantitative approaches, 
particularly through developing new 
indicators that capture key structural features 
such as inequality, relative deprivation (Stark 
&Taylor 1991), social security, and labour 
market structure. It goes without saying that all 
these factors are deeply affected by policies 
pursued by states. 
2.3 THE SENDING-COUNTRY GAP 
The weakness of labour market-based 
migration theories is that they focus on 
receiving country demand factors, and 
generally ignore how origin-country factors 
such as labour market structure, income levels 
and inequalities, social security, conflict, 
states and public policies, affect migration. At 
best, labour market-focused migration 
theories assume a quasi-unlimited supply of 
migrant labour, which seems to be implicitly 
based on the naïve notion that high population 
growth, poverty and warfare in developing 
countries ‘push’ migrants to leave, thereby 
virtually reducing their agency to zero. This 
notion clearly conflicts with empirical and 
theoretical insights on the intrinsic 
relationship between migration and broader 
processes of development and social 
transformation (Hatton & Williamson 1998; 
Massey 1991; Skeldon 1997; Zelinsky 1971). 
The latter insights question the ‘unlimited 
supply hypothesis’ and reveal a much more 
complex picture of how development 
processes affect migration and crucially 
undermine the assumptions underpinning 
conventional migration theories. 
For instance, conventional ideas that 
development in origin countries will reduce 
international migration are ultimately based 
on the assumption of ‘push-pull’ and ‘gravity’ 
models that there is an inversely proportional 
relationship between absolute levels and 
relative differences of wealth on the one hand 
and migration on the other. By contrast, 
another group of theories postulate that 
development leads to generally increased 
levels of immigration and emigration. 
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‘Migration transition theory’ hypothesizes that 
constraints-loosening and aspirations-
increasing economic and human development 
and parallel demographic transitions tend to 
have an inverted J-curve or U-curve effect on 
emigration rates (Mannan & Kozlov 1997). This 
hypothesized non-linearity and the complexity 
of development migration linkages contrast 
with conventional theories and also compel us 
to design different, theoretically informed 
empirical approaches away from standard 
‘push-pull’ and gravity models. 
More in general, the receiving-country bias of 
migration research points to the importance of 
advancing our theoretical understanding of 
the origin-country determinants of migration 
processes at different levels of aggregation. 
Social security and welfare spending is 
another example of a potentially crucial 
origin-country migration determinant. While 
there are several studies on the contested and 
questionable existence of a ‘welfare magnet’ 
effect on migration, this discussion is 
conspicuously biased towards destination 
states or countries, while there is reason to 
believe that factors such as social security 
matter equally if not more from an origin-
society perspective. More generally, this 
example also shows the need to fully take into 
account the role of structural and institutional 
factors in origin societies in shaping migration 
processes. 
2.4 ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC 
MIGRATION DETERMINANTS 
Conventional migration theories focus on how 
income and wage levels and, to a lesser extent, 
income inequalities affect migration 
processes. Although they might differ in their 
specification, they share a focus on economic 
differentials as the main driver of migration. 
This coincides with a research focus on labour 
migration and near-total separation from 
research on ‘forced’ or refugee migration. The 
implicit suggestion is that these different 
migration categories represent fundamentally 
different processes. There are many reasons to 
contest this view. After all, labels such as 
‘labour’, ‘refugee’, ‘family’ or ‘student’ 
migration primarily reflect legal categories, 
which are useful for administrative 
procedures, but are not very meaningful 
categories to help understand migration as a 
social process. For instance, the 
‘voluntary’/‘forced’ migration dichotomy is 
simplistic because it assumes that one 
category of migrants enjoys total freedom and 
the other category has no choice or agency at 
all. 
The legal-bureaucratic categories frequently 
used in social scientific research conceal the 
fact that, on a macro-level, migration 
processes are driven by a multitude of 
economic and non-economic factors and that, 
on a micro-level, migrants are motivated by a 
combination of multiple, interconnected but 
analytically distinct social, cultural, economic 
and political factors. For instance, economic 
development is positively associated with 
democratization processes (Burkhart & Lewis-
Beck 1994), and economic development and 
democratization are likely to affect migration 
processes simultaneously. It would be naïve to 
assume that refugees are also affected by 
economic and social considerations, certainly 
where destination choice is concerned. 
Likewise, ‘labour migrants’ are likely also to 
weigh personal freedoms in their migration 
decision-making. And ‘family migrants’ are 
potential workers too. 
These few examples also show the need to 
look beyond specific policies, and to consider 
the nature of states. For instance, the position 
of states both on the authoritarianism-
democracy and on the strong-weak central 
power continuums seems to be an important 
macro-structural determinant of migration 
processes, as both positions affect aspirations 
and capabilities to migrate and the extent to 
which states will desire and be able to ‘steer’ 
migration. There is also a clear need to 
differentiate between different types of 
freedoms as they are likely to affect migration 
in different ways. 
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3.1 THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS 
The main challenge for advancing migration 
theory is how to synthesize the different 
migration theories developed across a range 
of social science disciplines – ranging from 
economics to anthropology. Faced with the 
daunting complexity and diversity of 
migration processes, migration scholars have 
often – and perhaps wearingly – argued that an 
all-encompassing and all-explaining theory of 
migration will never arise (Salt 1987; Van 
Amersfoort 1998). Unfortunately, this probably 
sensible observation has coincided with a 
strong tendency to abandon theorizing 
migration altogether. Although migration is 
certainly a complex and apparently ‘messy’ 
process, this goes for virtually all social 
processes. Moreover, migration may be 
complex, but it is certainly not a random 
process. Instead, it is a strongly socially 
structured and spatially patterned process, in 
which strong regularities can be discerned. 
More generally, ‘all-comprehensiveness’ is 
not what social theory should be about in the 
first place. Social theory formation is precisely 
about striking a delicate balance between the 
desire to acknowledge the intricate 
complexities and the richness of social life on 
the one hand and the scientific need to discern 
underlying regularities, patterns and trends 
on the other. Theory formation is exactly about 
generalizing, which is a reductionist process 
by definition, where the exception may well 
prove the rule. Although it is indeed naïve to 
assume that a one-size-fits-all theory 
explaining migration at all places and at all 
times will ever arise, there is undoubtedly 
more room for theorizing on migration 
processes and how they reciprocally connect 
to broader processes of social and economic 
change. 
Much can already be gained from developing 
a more unified social-scientific perspective on 
migration, in which unproductive disciplinary 
boundaries are broken down. In their seminal 
review of migration theories, Massey et al. 
(1993) rightly argued that the different 
theories on migration are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Because different 
disciplines use different jargons and 
methodological tools, they often seem 
irreconcilable, but below the surface they 
often study similar processes and causal links. 
Once conceptual confusion is resolved by 
debate, and sufficient openness is created to 
learn from other methodological approaches, 
a lot of the apparent contradictions turn out to 
be rather spurious, and cross-fertilization can 
enrich theoretical thinking. For instance, the 
new economics of labour migration (NELM), 
which is one of the major past advances in 
economic migration theory, was apparently 
inspired by research on household 
composition and livelihood strategies 
conducted by anthropologists and sociologists 
(Lucas & Stark 1985). Although there are 
marked differences between different 
theories, disciplines and associated research 
traditions, they are not necessarily 
incompatible, and there is considerable room 
to identify more common grounds and to 
create conceptual bridges. 
However, an eclectic ‘combining of insights’ 
cannot solve some more fundamental 
problems, particularly when theories have 
different paradigmatic roots. For instance, it 
seems impossible to merge neo-classical and 
neo-Marxist migration theories, because they 
differ in their most fundamental assumptions. 
For similar reasons, theoretical problems 
cannot be solved by simply ‘plugging in’ 
variables ‘representing’ the different theories 
in the same regression equation, as is often the 
tendency. What is really lacking, and what is 
hindering theoretical synthesis, is a more 
comprehensive and convincing ‘behavioural’ 
framework of migration than the current 
theories offer. The only systematically 
elaborated micro-behavioural model of 
migration is neo-classical. Although neo-
classical migration theory has been much 
reviled for a number of more and less 
convincing reasons, no credible alternative 
has been proposed so far. 
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Despite the enormous value of macro-level 
theories developed by sociologists, 
geographers and demographers, because of 
their very macro-level nature they often lack a 
‘behavioural link’ to the micro-level. In other 
words, they do not make explicit the 
behavioural assumptions underpinning the 
macro-level correlations they assume or 
describe. It would be to commit a classical 
‘ecological fallacy’ to confound macro-level 
migration determinants with individual 
migration motives – which is exactly what the 
push-pull and non-expert literature on 
environmental change and migration typically 
does. After all, people do not migrate ‘because 
of’ abstract concepts such as demographic 
transitions, declining fertility, ageing, 
population density, environmental 
degradation or factor productivity. For 
instance, there may often be a correlation 
between demographic and migration 
transitions, but this does not make clear why 
people should necessarily migrate under 
conditions of high population growth. People 
will only migrate if they perceive better 
opportunities elsewhere and have the 
capabilities to move. Although this assertion 
implies choice and agency, it also shows that 
this agency is constrained by (historically 
determined) conditions which create concrete 
opportunity structures. 
Ultimately, in the social world, ‘causality’ 
therefore runs through people’s agency, 
producing outcomes on the aggregate level 
which can perhaps be measured through 
macro indicators. But any convincing macro-
model should be underpinned by a credible 
micro behavioural link. The lack of micro-
behavioural foundation makes most macro-
theories deterministic. In fact, the problem 
with the very term ‘determinants’ is that it 
conveys a somehow deterministic picture of 
‘causation from outside’, independent from 
migrants’ agency and internal migration 
dynamics. It seems therefore desirable to 
(re)define the concept of ‘determinants’ so as 
to include human agency, which has 
independent power to change social 
structures (Mannan & Krueger 2000). 
Crucially, most macro-theories ignore agency. 
At the same time, neo-classical migration 
theory has a reductionist, mechanistic concept 
of agency. Hence, what we need is a new and 
more realistic micro-level model or 
framework of migration. Such a framework 
should take into account empirical insights of 
decades of migration research from across a 
range of disciplines, but at the same time it 
should remain basic and parsimonious enough 
so as to fulfil its generalizing ambitions. Such a 
framework should specify the basic 
assumptions about the factors that make 
people decide to migrate (or not). Two further 
conditions need to be met: first, such a model 
should incorporate a sense of agency, and 
should not conceive migration as an almost 
‘mechanistic’ response to a range of ‘pushes’ 
or ‘pulls’, or wage differentials. Ultimately, this 
is also the reason why gravity models normally 
used for trade cannot be assumed to be valid 
to model human migration. People are not 
goods. Goods are passive. People are humans, 
who make active decisions based on their 
subjective aspirations and preferences, so 
their behaviour is not just a function of 
macrolevel disequilibria, neither does their 
behaviour necessarily decrease these 
disequilibria (Mannan & Kozlov 1999). Second, 
such a micro-model should incorporate a 
sense of structure, in the sense that migration 
behaviour is constrained by structurally 
determined resource and information 
limitations. 
This above analysis leads to the proposition 
that, in order to improve our insights into the 
factors driving migration, and to synthesize 
prior theories, an improved theoretical model 
of migration should: conceive migration 
aspirations as a function of spatial opportunity 
differentials and people’s life aspirations; and 
conceive migration propensities as a function 
of their aspirations and capabilities to migrate. 
These two basic assumptions about migration 
behaviour can serve as basic building blocks 
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to build a theory of migration which 
synthesizes many existing theoretical and 
empirical insights. Although this still needs 
considerable theoretical elaboration in future 
work, such a conceptualization would allow us 
to: integrate economic and non-economic 
theories on migration and overcome 
‘migration category’-based theorizing; 
integrate theories on so-called ‘voluntary’ and 
‘forced’ migration; link micro- to macro-
theories; and open new avenues for 
integrating agency and culture into migration 
theory. 
The conceptualization of migration as a 
function of opportunity rather than income or 
wage differentials compels us to study how 
social, economic and political conditions affect 
migration processes simultaneously. 
Improved empirical models should reflect this 
and would allow for the study of the relative 
importance of each of such factors as well as 
their mutual interaction. In an attempt to move 
beyond the artificial separation between 
economic and non-economic explanations, it 
seems useful to apply Amartya Sen’s (1999) 
capabilities approach to migration theory. In 
his book Development as Freedom, Sen (1999) 
defined development as the process of 
expanding the substantive freedoms that 
people enjoy. In order to operationalize these 
‘freedoms’, he used the concept of human 
capability, which refers to the ability of human 
beings to lead lives they have reason to value, 
and to enhance the substantive choices they 
have (Sen 1997: 1959). Sen stressed that 
freedom is central to the process of 
development primarily for its intrinsic, 
wellbeing-enhancing power, which has to be 
clearly distinguished from the instrumental 
effectiveness of freedoms of in contributing to 
economic progress, which have been the usual 
benchmark to ‘measure’ development. 
Within this capabilities perspective, this study 
conceive human mobility as an integral part of 
human development for both intrinsic and 
instrumental reasons. First, people can only 
move if they have the capabilities to do so. 
Human mobility can be defined as the 
capability to decide where to live – and 
migration is the associated functioning. 
Expansions in this capability are an expansion 
of the choices open to an individual and 
therefore of their freedom. This is the intrinsic 
argument why mobility can be an integral part 
of human development. At the same time, 
movement can enable people to improve 
other dimensions relevant to their capabilities 
such as their income, their health, the 
education of themselves and of their children, 
and their self-respect. This is the instrumental 
value of mobility for development.  
This is why it is important to distinguish 
between the capability to move and the act of 
movement. In fact, some manifestations of 
migration are a result of the choices and 
freedoms of individuals becoming more 
restricted. So, enhanced mobility is not only 
the freedom to move – it is also the freedom to 
stay in one’s preferred location. Having choice 
to stay or to go, and where to go, captures the 
very essence of agency. The application of a 
capabilities-focused conceptualization of 
development (Sen 1999) also creates 
conceptual room to fully include factors such 
as education, health, social security, various 
inequalities, and personal and political 
freedoms as migration determinants. It also 
creates room to broaden our view of freedom- 
and wellbeing-generating resources to 
include not only economic, but also human and 
social resources or ‘capitals’. 
Another conceptual advantage of Sen’s 
perspective is that the notion of capabilities 
creates analytical room to start incorporating 
notions of agency in migration theory. The 
concept of agency is intrinsically linked to the 
power of social actors to affect processes of 
structural change. It is important to emphasize 
that agency can both sustain as well as alter 
processes and structural conditions 
(Emirbayer & Mische 1998). From this, 
migration itself can be conceptualized as a 
form, or expression of, agency, and not only a 
‘functionalist’ response to spatial differentials 
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in economic opportunity. However, the extent 
to which social actors can exert agency is 
dependent on structural conditions which 
determine the space of manoeuvre within 
which individuals can make independent 
choices. Within the capabilities framework, 
the act of migration itself can be wellbeing-
enhancing for the intrinsic value of the 
migration experience. Crucially, this enables 
us to incorporate manifestations of migration 
and mobility, where the experience itself is an 
important motive for moving, and the 
improvement of material circumstances plays 
a relatively minor role. As with tourism, 
through discovering new horizons and 
acquainting oneself with other cultures, in 
particular for young people, migration can 
have an intrinsic wellbeing-enhancing 
dimension. 
As a next conceptual step, and drawing on 
Isaiah Berlin’s (1969) concepts of negative and 
positive liberty, we can conceptualize 
capabilities as a function of positive and 
negative freedoms. Within Berlin’s 
perspective, negative liberty means the 
absence of obstacles, barriers or constraints. 
This comes close to classical ways of 
conceiving freedom, which are particularly 
focused on the role of states and politics in 
imposing constraints on people’s freedom or 
even being an outright threat to people’s lives. 
This concept of liberty is also the basis for the 
United Nations Refugee Protection regime, 
and international human rights organizations. 
Within this perspective, democracy, conflict 
prevention and promoting the rule of law are 
typically seen as ways to promote people’s 
freedoms and to prevent ‘forced’ migration. 
Berlin’s (1969) concept of positive liberty 
refers to the possibility or the fact of acting in 
such a way as to take control of one’s life and 
realize one’s fundamental purposes. This 
concept pertains to the agency of individuals 
and groups to change their life circumstances 
and to escape from disadvantaged positions. It 
is enshrined in international human rights8 
and notions of ‘empowerment’ in development 
theory. Positive liberty embodies the notion 
that the absence of external constraint is not a 
sufficient condition for people to improve their 
wellbeing. This is a point that Amartya Sen has 
particularly stressed in his development 
theory. For instance, a given state might be 
formally democratic and there might be an 
absence of political persecutions, but illiterate 
and poor people generally lack the 
capabilities and resources to actually make 
use of such liberties. In other words, people 
need access to resources in the forms of social, 
human and material capital in order to exert 
their agency, such as the freedom to migrate 
or not to migrate. This reveals a fundamental 
paradox: although relative deprivation of 
freedoms and an awareness of better 
opportunities elsewhere may make people 
aspire to migrate, absolute deprivation of 
either negative or positive freedoms, or both, 
will prevent them from exerting such 
migratory agency. 
So, from a capabilities point of view, the very 
term ‘forced migration’ is somehow an 
oxymoron, as people still need capabilities to 
be able to migrate. While deprivation of 
negative freedoms is likely to motivate people 
to migrate, they need a certain level of 
empowerment or access to positive freedoms 
in order to actually be capable of fleeing 
towards a particular destination. When people 
are deprived of both freedoms, they are 
generally forced to stay where they are. In 
conflict situations, the most deprived are 
typically the ones who are ‘forced to stay’. The 
concept of negative freedom is also useful for 
theorizing the role of immigration and 
emigration policies. Restrictive immigration 
policies can decreases people’s ‘negative 
freedoms’ to migrate, and can create situations 
of ‘involuntary immobility’, a term aptly coined 
by Carling (2002). Such involuntary immobility 
can also occur under restrictive emigration 
policies.  
However, even under liberal migration 
policies where people may enjoy abundant 
negative freedoms, if they are deprived of the 
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basic positive freedoms and access to social, 
human and economic resources, they will still 
be unable to migrate, particularly over larger 
distances. All of this helps to explain the 
paradox of why development often coincides 
with increasing levels of migration. From this, 
the author hypothesize that most emigration is 
likely to occur when people enjoy a maximum 
of negative freedoms and a moderate level of 
positive freedoms, as very high levels of 
positive freedoms and declining spatial 
opportunity differentials would somehow 
decrease their aspirations to migrate. This also 
shows why so-called push-pull theories are 
fundamentally flawed: with the exception of 
extreme situations like slavery, people are not 
goods that can be passively moved: they need 
to move by themselves, and a fundamental 
precondition for that to happen is that they 
have the willingness and capabilities to do so. 
This brings in the concept of aspirations, which 
is a crucial element of this attempt at 
theoretical synthesis and, particularly, the 
attempt to better incorporate agency in 
migration theory. Conventional migration 
theories either totally disregard or have very 
reductionist notions of agency. Although 
within neoclassical and other functionalist 
migration theories, there is room for individual 
decision-making, there is no genuine room for 
agency, because individual behaviour is a 
totally predictable, mechanistic outcome of 
wage and other opportunity differentials. The 
underlying assumptions are that people are 
free from constraints, enjoy full access to 
information, and make migration decisions 
with the aim of maximizing their utility. These 
are clearly unrealistic assumptions. Although 
mainstream economics and, to a certain 
extent, migration economics have come a long 
way to acknowledge information and market 
imperfections in their theories and models, the 
utility-maximizing notion underlying decision-
making has not been fundamentally 
challenged. 
Here, it is important to observe that push-pull 
and gravity models as well as neoclassical and 
other functionalist migration theories 
implicitly assume that people’s preferences 
and, hence, aspirations are constant across 
societies and over time, and basically boil 
down to individual income maximization. In 
other words, people living in different 
societies, despite the huge variations in the 
amount and type of information and social, 
cultural and economic resources they can 
access, are somehow assumed to react in 
similar fashions to similar external stimuli or 
exogenously defined ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. 
This is what makes functionalist theory 
inherently mechanistic and their micro-
models totally devoid of any real sense of 
agency, as individual choices are entirely 
predictable and human beings are, indeed, 
conceptualized to be ‘pulled’ and ‘pushed’ in 
space like atoms without their own will and 
ability to make independent choices and, 
herewith, affect structural change. 
Functionalist theory conceptualizes migration 
as an equilibrium- and system-reinforcing 
process. It therefore leaves no analytical room 
for either structural inequalities embedded in 
social hierarchies or migrants exercising 
agency.  
The crucial problem is that functionalist 
migration theory assumes that overall 
preferences are more or less constant across 
societies and over time. This ignores the fact 
that culture, education and access and 
exposure to particular forms of information are 
likely to have a huge impact on people’s 
notions of the good life and, hence, personal 
life aspirations; and their awareness and 
perception of opportunities elsewhere. If 
people do not aspire to other lifestyles 
‘elsewhere’, even if they seem ‘objectively’ or 
‘materially’ better, they will not translate this 
awareness into a desire to migrate. In fact, 
cultural ‘home preference’ seems to be a 
major explanation for why most people do not 
migrate. On the other hand, if migration-as-an-
experience is intrinsically seen as wellbeing-
enhancing, people might even voluntary opt 
for ‘objectively’ less favourable 
circumstances. Nevertheless, it seems 
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reasonable to hypothesize that, in general, 
people’s personal life aspirations and 
awareness of opportunities elsewhere 
increase when levels of education and access 
to information improve in processes that are 
usually conceived as ‘human development’. If 
this coincides with the occurrence of 
significant differences in structurally 
determined spatial opportunity differentials, 
this is more likely to generate aspirations to 
migrate in an attempt to fulfil these life 
aspirations.. 
Altogether, this yields a more comprehensive 
picture of behavioural causes of migration 
beyond the basic model of income-
maximizing individuals reacting to wage 
differentials. Such an amended theoretical 
framework also helps us to re-conceptualize 
migration as an intrinsic part of processes of 
human development rather than the ‘outcome’ 
of development failure or a function of income 
and wage differentials or other externally 
given ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. Conceiving 
migration as a function of capabilities and 
aspirations to migrate also gives us better, 
albeit certainly not perfect, conceptual tools to 
start incorporating meaningful notions of 
agency in theoretical models and empirical 
approaches. More in general, the 
simultaneous incorporation of agency and 
structure in migration theories remains one of 
the main challenges for advancing migration 
theory and, hence, the specification of more 
realistic empirical approaches.  
A key condition for incorporating structure 
and agency is to connect both concepts and to 
understand their dialectics. In this respect, 
‘structure’ is often erroneously seen as a set of 
constraints, whereas in reality structures 
simultaneously constrain and facilitate agency. 
As we have seen, factors such as states and 
policies, economic and social inequalities as 
well as networks have a strong structuring 
effect on migration, which means that they are 
inclusive for some groups and exclusive for 
others, and that they strongly favour migration 
along certain geographical pathways while 
discouraging it along others. This typically 
leads to a rather neat social and geographical 
structuring and clustering of migration. 
So, the ensemble of structural conditions 
creates complex opportunity structures, 
endowing different individuals and social 
groups with different sets of negative and 
positive freedoms, which, depending on how 
these constellations affect their capabilities 
and aspirations, may or may not make them 
decide to migrate. In its turn, such agency will 
reciprocally affect these initial conditions 
through feedback effects, exemplifying the 
dialectics of structure and agency in migration 
processes. 
3.2 MICRO AND MACRO LEVELS 
The challenge to link agency and structure is 
also related to the difficulties of linking micro 
level explanations of migration, which focus on 
how individual characteristics, access to 
resources, perceptions and preferences shape 
migration behaviour, to macro-level level 
theories which, ultimately, see migrants’ 
behaviour as a rather passive, and therefore 
rather predictable, outcome of given 
opportunity structures. In the literature it has 
been argued that meso-level theories on the 
formation of networks and migration systems 
provide this vital link (Faist 1997). The 
migration literature has identified various 
feedback mechanisms which explain why, 
once started, migration processes tend to 
become partly self-perpetuating, leading to 
the formation of migrant networks and 
migration systems (Mabogunje 1970; Massey 
1990; Massey et al. 1998).  
Such feedback loops provide a powerful, 
concrete example of the dialectics between 
agency and structure, as they show how 
migrants create meso-level structures such as 
networks and the ‘migration industry’ (Castles 
2004a) that have a knock-on effect in 
reinforcing migration between particular 
places and countries through counter-flows of 
ideas and information (Mabogunje 1970), as 
well as decreasing the costs and risks of 
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migration (Massey et al. 1998), thereby 
actively defying structural constraints such as 
high travel costs and restrictive immigration 
policies. This is a prime example of how 
migrants exert agency and are able to change 
initial structural conditions in such a way that 
they further facilitate migration along 
particular pathways. It is also a prime 
explanation of why states often find it difficult 
to control once-started migration processes. 
These notions are crucial for theorizing the 
role of states and policies in migration 
processes. 
However, existing theories on these ‘internal 
dynamics’ of migration processes are 
characterized by some fundamental 
weaknesses which I reviewed in another 
paper. First, the usual focus on migrant 
networks coincides with a neglect of other 
feedback dynamics that operate through the 
impact of migration on the sending and 
receiving contexts (Mannan & Krueger 2004). 
Migration inevitably changes the initial 
structural conditions under which migration 
takes place in sending and receiving 
communities and societies, which, in their 
turn, reciprocally affect people’s aspirations 
and capabilities to migrate. Examples of such 
structural impacts include the impact of 
migration on income inequality and relative 
deprivation in origin societies, the migration-
facilitating role of remittances, and the rise of 
immigrant-dominated entrepreneurial sectors 
in destination countries, as well as the 
segmentation of labour markets along ethnic 
lines (Mannan & Kozlov 2003). Such processes 
contribute to the formation of migration 
systems – a set of places or countries linked by 
flows and counterflows of people, goods, 
services, and information, which tend to 
facilitate further exchange, including 
migration, between the places (Fawcett 1989; 
Kritz et al. 1992; Mabogunje 1970; Massey et al. 
1998). 
Second, the largely circular logic of these 
theories reveals an inability to conceptualize 
which migration-undermining feedback 
mechanisms may counteract migration-
facilitating feedback dynamics and which may 
explain the endogenous decline of established 
migration systems. Theoretically, this can be 
explained by applying insights from the 
critical social capital literature pioneered by 
Portes (1998) and, in particular, the notion of 
negative social capital, to migration theories. 
Migrants do not necessarily help each other, 
and strong social ties and networks can also 
exclude non-group members. One of the 
methodological lessons is that empirical 
models should not just assume that the 
strength of network effects is a function of the 
size of migrant communities, as recent 
quantitative work tends to do. The relative 
importance of networks in facilitating 
migration crucially depends on the relative 
dependence on social capital among migrant 
communities. Moreover, positive network 
effects tend to decline over time. 
3.3 THEORIZING THE ROLE OF STATES 
AND POLICIES  
If anything, the above analysis points to the 
preponderance of structural factors such as 
economic and human development, labour 
market structure, social stratification, income 
inequalities, relative deprivation and social 
security, and the role of negative freedoms as 
well as positive freedoms in the form of access 
to material, social and human capital in 
shaping people’s capabilities and aspirations 
to migrate. This compels us to ask the 
following crucial question: within this broader 
whole of big forces and structural factors, and 
migrants’ considerable agency to shape and 
consolidate migration pathways and networks, 
what role is still left for migration policies 
pursued by states? Is that a comparatively 
marginal one, or do policies still play a key 
role? 
There is no simple answer to that question, first 
of all because the role of states and policies 
seems to vary according to the nature of the 
states, and is also dependent on the phase of 
migration system formation. The answer also 
crucially depends on whether we refer to the 
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role of states in general or the role of specific 
migration policies. However, based on this 
theoretical framework it is possible to 
elaborate a few hypotheses. These are based 
on the notion that migration policies primarily 
affect negative freedoms in the form of the 
right to leave or enter a national territory, but 
that, primarily through non-migration policies 
(such as economic and education), states also 
affect people’s positive freedoms. While these 
factors affect people’s capabilities to migrate, 
factors such as repression and poverty affect 
people’s aspirations to migrate. 
First, the power of states to influence 
immigration and, particularly, emigration is 
much higher for repressive, authoritarian and 
centralized states than for liberal, democratic 
and decentralized states, which need to take 
more account of democratic processes and 
fundamental human rights. Second, we can 
hypothesize that states and policies often play 
an important role in the initiation of 
international migration, whether in the form of 
recruitment, visa requirements, colonialism, 
military occupation, or political repression 
(Entzinger 1985; Massey et al. 1998; Penninx 
1982; Skeldon 1997). On the other hand, it is 
important to emphasize that this is not always 
the case and that certain policies, such as 
recruitment, can also be an attempt to 
formalize already existing flows. 
However, once a certain number of migrants 
have settled at the destination, migration can 
become partly self-perpetuating (Castles 
2004b; Massey 1990; Massey et al. 1998). The 
‘internal dynamics’ of migration processes 
make additional movements more likely 
through various social, cultural and economic 
feedback mechanisms. According to 
migration systems theory (Mabogunje 1970), 
such mechanisms lead to almost organized 
migratory flows between particular regions 
and countries (Kritz et al. 1992; Portes & Böröcz 
1987). In particular, migrant networks are 
believed to play a crucial role in facilitating 
continued migration over formally closed 
borders (Böcker 1994), which is a key example 
of how migrants’ agency and counter-
strategies can actively undermine states’ 
attempts to control migration. 
Many migration scholars are therefore 
sceptical about the abilities of liberal 
democratic states to control migration. They 
argue that fluctuations in migration primarily 
respond to structural demand factors 
determined by human development, 
economic cycles, employment and changes in 
the structure of segmented labour markets; 
factors which largely lie beyond the reach of 
policy-makers. At the same time, migrant 
networks further facilitate migration along 
established pathways. Hence the assertion that 
‘borders are largely beyond control and little 
can be done to really cut down on immigration’ 
(Bhagwati 2003). Other scholars have 
countered such scepticism by arguing that, on 
the whole, immigration policies have been 
largely effective (Brochmann & Hammar 1999; 
Carling 2002; Strikwerda1999). 
However, this is partly a spurious 
disagreement. Considerable conceptual 
confusion can be reduced by clearly 
distinguishing the preponderant role of states 
in migration processes from the comparatively 
more marginal role of specific immigration 
and emigration policies. There can be no 
doubt that states can play an absolutely crucial 
role in shaping and transforming migration 
patterns (Brochmann & Hammar 1999; Skeldon 
1997; Strikwerda 1999). Over the course of 
modern history, trends and patterns of 
migration have been intrinsically linked to 
processes of state formation and decline, 
economic and territorial imperialism and 
warfare. The very notion of international 
migration presumes the existence of national 
states and clearly defined territorial and 
institutional borders. The importance of factors 
such as economic and human development, 
labour markets, education and income 
inequalities points to the importance of non-
migration policies, such as labour market, 
taxation, social welfare and foreign policies in 
indirectly affecting migration processes. From 
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this, it is possible to hypothesize that state 
influence is primarily felt through general 
policies rather than migration policies per se, 
as the latter have a limited influence on the 
main determinants of migration. 
In the face of the dispute in migration research 
about the effectiveness of migration policy, it 
is important minimize conceptual confusion by 
clearly defining what constitutes migration 
policy and by distinguishing policy 
effectiveness from policy effects. Migration 
policies can be defined as laws, rules, 
measures, and practices implemented by 
national states with the stated objective to 
influence the volume, origin and internal 
composition of migration flows. The term 
‘effectiveness’ refers to the extent to which 
policy objectives have been met, while the 
‘effect’ just refers to the actual impact of a 
particular law, measure or regulation. This 
gives effectiveness a strong evaluative 
dimension. 
3.4 SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS OF 
MIGRATION POLICIES 
The migration policy literature has argued that 
immigration policies frequently fail because 
they have several unintended, often counter-
productive effects. Within the framework 
developed in this paper, migrants’ agency – in 
particular their creative ability to defy 
immigration rules by adopting new migration 
strategies and pathways – plays a key role in 
explaining such unintended effects. However, 
the existence and strength of such ‘perverse’ 
effects is highly contested, and therefore 
requires better empirical testing. It is 
reasonable to assume that migration policies, 
if implemented, must have some effect on 
migration. The crucial questions are: which 
effects, and what is the relative importance of 
these effects compared to other migration 
determinants.  
Recent reviews of immigration policies lead to 
the hypothesis that policies are more effective 
in determining the selection and composition 
of migration rather than the overall volume 
and long-term trends of migration. However, 
the impact of policies on migration volumes of 
the particularly targeted category receive 
most if not all attention, which is unfortunate as 
the effects on other flows are crucial in 
understanding the structural and long-term 
effects of migration policies on overall 
migration flows. Based on the above analysis, I 
hypothesize that immigration restrictions can 
potentially lead to four main types of 
substitution effects which can reduce the effect 
of restrictions on inflows in the particular, 
targeted category: 
 Spatial substitution effects may occur 
through the diversion of migration to 
countries with less restrictive 
regulations for similar categories of 
migrants. There is some largely 
descriptive evidence observing such 
spatial substitution effects for asylum, 
family and irregular migration to 
Europe and North America. In the 
Dutch language, such spatial 
substitution effects have also been 
dubbed as the ‘waterbed effect’ 
(Grütters 2003; van der Erf 2003). 
 Categorical substitution effects may 
occur due to a reorientation towards 
other legal or illegal channels when 
entry through one particular channel 
becomes more difficult. For instance, it 
has frequently been argued that the 
lack of immigration channels for low-
skilled labour migrants has compelled 
migration through family, asylum or 
student migration channels by people 
who basically migrated to work (Harris 
2002; Massey 2004) and that it has 
increased irregular migration (Castles 
2004b). 
 Inter-temporal substitution effects or 
‘now or never migration’ may occur if 
migration surges in the expectation of 
a future tightening of migration 
regulations. For instance, it has been 
argued that when the Federal Republic 
of Germany tried to discourage family 
reunification in the late 1970s, family 
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migration to the Federal Republic 
increased, since many migrants feared 
that, eventually, family reunification 
might be forbidden completely 
(Entzinger 1985). There was a surge in 
Surinamese migration to the 
Netherlands in the 1970s around 
independence, and a surge in West 
Indian migration before 1962, when 
restrictions were introduced with the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act 
(Peach 1968). Such effects have also 
been described for asylum migration 
(Grütters 2003). After the introduction 
of more restrictions, immigration 
typically shows a sharp fall. The long-
term effect of such restrictions may 
thus be limited by the premeasure 
surge in inflows. 
 Reverse flow substitution effects occur 
when immigration restrictions 
decrease return migration flows. 
Several studies have argued that 
restrictive immigration policies 
discourage return migration and 
therefore push migrants into 
permanent settlement. This 
phenomenon has been described for 
Turkish and Moroccan ‘guest worker’ 
migration to north-west Europe, where 
many temporary workers ended up 
settling after the post 1973 recruitment 
ban (Böcker 1994; Entzinger 1985). If 
migration restrictions decrease 
inflows but simultaneously also 
decrease return flows, their effect on 
net inflows becomes much more 
ambiguous. However, such 
hypotheses have not been subjected 
to empirical tests. 
Above four hypotheses about the unintended 
effects of policy restrictions need to be taken 
into account when measuring the effect of 
particular policies on migration flows. 
Decreases in restrictiveness are likely to have 
the opposite effect, and restrictive emigration 
policies can also have more or less similar 
spatial, categorical, inter-temporal and 
reverse flow substitution effects. As has been 
argued above, the danger of exclusively 
focusing on the particular inflow targeted by 
the policy is to over-estimate its effect. It is 
only by focusing on the effects of policy on 
overall migration flows through other spatial 
and legal channels and over a longer time 
period that a more comprehensive and 
methodologically valid picture can be 
obtained. 
Additional hypotheses can be elaborated on 
the policy effects of frequently used 
nonrestrictive policy instruments. Examples 
may include the oft-assumed ‘pull effect’ of 
legalizations of irregular migrants, which have 
made such policies politically controversial. 
However, the existence of such pull effects has 
been contested based on descriptive 
quantitative analyses, indicating that this 
hypothesis needs proper testing. 
Another example is the effect of labour 
recruitment agreements. It has been argued 
that their effect is much lower than often 
hypothesized (Reniers 1999; Shadid 1979), but 
here also there is an absence of adequate, 
empirical tests. Besides measuring the direct 
effects of migration policies on the volume of 
flows within the migration category targeted 
by specific policies, empirical analyses within 
the determinants of migration project will 
focus on testing for these various substitution 
effects in order to acquire a more 
comprehensive empirical insight into the 
effects of migration policies. It goes without 
saying that empirical analyses will control for 
other theoretically relevant sending- and 
receiving-country migration determinants 
derived from the conceptual framework 
developed in this paper. 
4.1 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, the author have argued that 
although the effectiveness of migration 
policies has been widely contested in the face 
of their supposed failure to steer immigration 
and their hypothesized counter-productive 
effects, empirical evidence has remained 
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inconclusive as a consequence of fundamental 
methodological and conceptual limitations. 
Although the general migration policy 
literature has yielded a rich set of hypotheses 
on possible policy effects, empirical evidence 
is mostly descriptive or anecdotal. At the same 
time, the migration determinants literature 
suffers from methodological problems and is 
largely based on obsolete and theoretically 
uninformed push-pull and gravity models, and 
is biased by omitting crucial sending-country, 
non-economic and policy factors. The 
scholarly analysis of policy effects has 
remained under-theorized, and poorly 
connected to general migration theory. 
Because of this lack of precision and 
specification, it remains unclear how migration 
policies affect migration flows when other 
forces driving international migration are 
taken into account. Most empirical models 
miss out the ‘big picture’ by focusing on short-
term fluctuations on particular migration flows 
and do not take into account the impact of 
policies on overall and long-term migration 
patterns and trends. More fundamentally, the 
contested nature of this debate reveals a still 
limited understanding of the forces driving 
international migration and the lack of 
theoretically driven research. Although there 
is consensus that macro-contextual economic 
and political factors and meso-level factors 
such as networks all play ‘some’ role, there is 
no agreement on their relative weight and 
mutual interaction. To start filling this gap, this 
paper outlined the contours of a conceptual 
framework for generating improved insights 
into the ways states and policies shape 
migration processes in their interaction with 
structural migration determinants in receiving 
and sending countries. 
This paper tried to argue that the current 
research impasse can only be overcome by 
firmly embedding the multi-method, 
longitudinal empirical analysis of policy 
effects into a more comprehensive theoretical 
framework of the macro and meso-level forces 
driving international migration. The author 
have argued that the fragmented insights from 
different disciplinary theories can be 
integrated in one model through 
conceptualizing virtually all manifestations of 
migration as a function of capabilities and 
aspirations to migrate and also proposed a set 
of hypotheses on perverse ‘substitution 
effects’ of migration policies which can guide 
future empirical research. 
However, the limited ability of prior research 
to assess the role of states and policies and 
migration processes is not only linked to 
theoretical problems, but also to concomitant 
methodological problems and important 
limitations. Nevertheless, from this paper it 
may already be clear that, in order to be 
tested, the key hypotheses about potential 
substitution effects require particular data and 
methodological approaches. First of all, spatial 
substitution effects can only be studied 
through ‘double comparative’ approaches 
which simultaneously study the migration of 
multiple origin groups to and from multiple 
destination countries. Such double 
comparative analyses require the availability 
of bilateral flow data. Also for studying inter-
temporal substitution effects, a key 
requirement is the availability of bilateral flow 
data which preferably spans several decades. 
The theoretical relevance of reverse flow 
substitution effects reveals the need to 
consider immigration and emigration as 
separate social phenomena which require 
aggregate and, preferably, bilateral migration 
data that differentiate between outflows and 
inflows. The study of categorical substitution 
effects requires migration flow data which 
differentiate between the different migrant 
categories. 
However, it is important to emphasize that not 
all problems can be ‘fixed’ just by collecting 
better data and specifying better quantitative 
models. Ultimately, empirical research should 
be theory- and not data-driven, and the point 
is that many theoretically relevant structural 
factors are indeed difficult to quantify. There 
are serious limitations in the availability of 
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reliable indicators and it would also be naïve 
to assume that such indicators can capture all 
relevant dimensions of such structural 
features. Empirical quantitative models should 
be improved as much as possible. However, 
this cannot solve all problems, and the ‘non-
quantifiability’ of certain factors should not be 
a reason to ignore them. 
To combine the different strengths of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches, 
methodological triangulation seems to be a 
more promising avenue. Such an approach 
systematically combines formal quantitative 
tests of key indicators using panel datasets 
with detailed case studies studying the relation 
between transformations of economic 
structures and labour markets and migration 
patterns for particular countries or regional 
blocks. Such case studies should provide an 
empirically ‘thick’, informed description, 
supplemented, whenever possible, with 
exploratory quantitative analysis. This can 
serve to develop new ideas and hypotheses as 
well as a ‘plausibility-check’ of results 
generated by formal tests. 
Policy reviews should also include a 
qualitative assessment of the effects and 
effectiveness of these policies, from which 
hypotheses can be derived. Because much 
information on policies will be lost through 
quantification, the qualitative review and 
categorization of migration policies has a value 
in itself, and contributes to the improvement of 
the conceptual framework. Methodological 
heterodoxy and true interdisciplinary 
openness are therefore central conditions for 
advancing research on migration 
determinants. Through creatively integrating 
qualitative and quantitative approaches, it is 
possible to increase insights into the nature 
and evolution of migration policies and their 
effects on the size, direction, timing and 
composition of migration flows. Eventually, 
such an open, creative and flexible approach 
will enhance our ability to create a generalized 
theoretical understanding of the determinants 
of international migration. 
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